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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

[t]he deprivation of any tools and equipment tends in obvious
ways to limit the party's ability to earn a living; imposes tremendous hardship on the defendant; and gives the plaintiff unwarranted leverage. The chattels seized by the plaintiff from the
defendant herein were special property.1 °4
Subsequent to this decision but prior to its affirmance, 105 the
United States Supreme Court decided Fuentes v. Shevin.10° Invalidating the prejudgment replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania,
the Court struck down the troublesome property classifications: "The
Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property' generally. .

.

. It is not

the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to . . protect
only the ones that, by its own lights, are 'necessary.' "107 The Court
recognized that "extraordinary situations" might justify outright seizure, but cautioned that these "must be truly unusual." 108 This warning was strictly adhered to in the Cedar Rapids affirmance, in which
the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the case did not
fall within the Fuentes exception.
Justice Stewart stated for the majority in Fuentes that the Sniadach holding should not be read as placing a limitation on procedural
due process, but rather as emphasizing the special importance of the
property involved therein, i.e., wages. 1 9 It is now clear that the type
of property sought to be replevied is irrelevant, and that due process
will afford the litigant an opportunity to present a defense before
the seizure, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.
ARTn=CLE 75 - ARBITRATION
CPLR 7501: Separability of the arbitrationprovision- time to reconcile New York and federal approaches.
When a party alleges fraudulent inducement of a contract containing an arbitration provision, the issue arises as to whether a court
of law or the arbitrator is to pass upon the question of fraud. If the
arbitration provision is viewed as separable from the underlying contract, there is no logical difficulty in permitting the arbitrator to determine whether the contract has been fraudulently induced, since the
104 68 Misc. 2d at 210, 826 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
105 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 383 N.Y.S.2d 953 (3d Dep't 1972).
106 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (4-3).

107 Id. at 90. The Court noted that summary seizure of property has been allowed to
collect federal taxes, to further a national war effort, to counteract the effects of a bank
failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food. Id.
at 91-92.
108 Id. at 90.

109 Id. at 89.
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arbitrator's authority can be viewed as arising from the separate agreement to arbitrate." 0 Where the arbitration clause is considered nonseparable, however, to allow the arbitrator to evaluate the allegations
of fraud would be to permit him to determine the very basis of his own
authority, for if the contract is voided, the arbitration provision must
similarly fall.
The United States Supreme Court has viewed the arbitration
clause as separable from the principal contract, and has held that the
issue of the validity of the underlying contract may properly be submitted to the arbitrator,"' unless the fraudulent inducement pertains
specifically to the arbitration clause itself.112 The rationale is that the
parties' mutual promises to arbitrate support the arbitration agreement. Importantly, the United States Arbitration Act" 8 apparently
distinguishes between the arbitration clause and the underlying contract. 114
In Housekeeperv. Lourie,"5 the Appellate Division, First Department, recently held that the issue of fraudulent inducement of an
arbitration contract must be decided as a threshold question by a
court before the parties can proceed to arbitration. While the separability approach is well settled under federal substantive law, the New
York courts, as Housekeeper indicates, have generally held that the
arbitration clause is a subordinate element of the entire contract, the
validity of which is a matter for judicial determination." 6 The law
110"Generally, the mutual promise of both parties to arbitrate will be a good and
sufficient consideration each for the other because rights and obligations are in this
very contract divided between the parties." M. DomKE, THE LAW AND PRAGMCE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATiON 32 (1968) [hereinafter DOMKE].
11 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). See also
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 US. 801 (1960).
112 See Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963). The Supreme Court held that, where a plaintiff alleges that an arbitration clause in a contract
involving interstate commerce is an integral part of a fraudulent scheme whereby the
contract was induced, the issue of fraud is to be decided by a court.
11S 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
114 The Supreme Court, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395 (1967), interpreted § 4 of the federal Arbitration Act as providing for separability,
whereas the Second Circuit, in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d
402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960), construed § 2 as embracing the
separability concept.
115 39 App. Div. 2d 280, 333 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Ist Dep't 1972).
116 See generally Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915, 925-27
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960); Annot., Claim of Fraud in Inducement of
Contract as Subject to Compulsory Arbitration Clause Contained in Contract, 91 A.L.R.2d
936 (1963); Note, Judicial Control of the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction:A Changing Attitude,
58 Nw. U. L. REv. 521 (1963); Comment, The Arbitrable Issue: The Problem of Fraud, 28
FORDHAm L. REv. 802 (1960); Comment, Arbitration Clauses and Fraudulent Inducement,
42 WASH. L. REv. 621, 626-29 (1967).
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in New York on this point remains uncertain, however, and the increasingly significant role of arbitration in commercial transactions
impels New York to adopt the federal approach.
17
New York enacted the first modem arbitration statute, which
was the model for the federal statute.118 Previously, arbitration agreements were unenforceable as against public policy. 119 The constitu20 indeed, the
tionality of the New York statute was soon confirmed;
Legislature and the judiciary now encourage arbitration.12
While it was early argued that the New York statute supports
separability, 22 New York has not formally adopted that approach, but
has treated the question in accordance with traditional contract
theory. 123 In viewing the contract and the arbitration clause as nonseparable, the courts have held that fraudulent inducement renders a
contract voidable rather than void. 24 In an action for rescission, the
relief sought is not merely termination of the contract, but a declaration that it is void ab initio.125 The arbitration clause, as part of the
117 L. 1920, ch. 275. The New York arbitration statute was incorporated under article

84 of the CPA, §§ 1448-69. The present statute is found in article 75 of the CPLR,
§§ 7501-14. For the historical background of the New York act, see 8 WK86-M 7501.01.
118 Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883. The federal Arbitration Act is
currently found in 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
119 Meacham v. Jamestown F. & C.R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.. 653 (1914); Hurst v.
Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377 (1868).
120 Mohawk Mfg. Co. v. Cavicchi, 281 N.Y. 629, 22 N.E.2d 179 (1959); Berkovitz v.
Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921).
121 For a general discussion of the value of arbitration in resolving disputes quickly
and economically and relieving over crowded courts, see Dworkin, Arbitration:An Obvious Solution to a Crowded Docket, 31 Omo BAR 1124 (1958); Smith, Commercial Arbitration at the American Arbitration Association, 11 ARB. J. (n.s.) 3 (1956).
122 Sturges, Fraudulent Inducement as a Defense to the Enforcement of Arbitration
Contracts, 36 YAux L.J. 866 (1927). Dean Sturges argued that § 2 of the New York
Arbitration Act (CPA 1448), which made arbitration agreements "valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable," could be interpreted as making the arbitration clause separable from the
principal contract. The Second Circuit in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960), argued similarly in
interpreting § 2 of the federal statute. See also Nussbaum, The "Separability Doctrine"
in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 609 (1940); Parsell, Arbitration
of Fraud in the Inducement of a Contract,12 CommELL L.Q. 351 (1927).
123 See Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N.Y. 15, 139 N.E. 764 (1923).
124 See Annot., Claim of Fraud in Inducement of Contract as Subject to Compulsory
Arbitration Clause Contained in Contract,91 A.L.R.2d 936, 938 (1963).
125 The court in Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915 (Ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960), observed:
The purpose of an action for rescission, as distinguished from one for damages,
is to permit the defrauded party to obtain restitution of the benefits conferred
by him. The contract is not merely terminated (as with a 'rescission' based on
total breach), but is abrogated and undone from the beginning.
280 F.2d at 927, citing BLACK, RJCISSION OF CoNTRAcrs AND CANCELLATION OF WRITrFEN
INSTRUMENTS § 1 (2d ed. 1929); 2 RESrATEmENT OF CoNaAcrs § 349, comment a at 596
(1932).
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entire contract, would then also be voided, and there would 26be no
valid source from which the arbitrator could derive his power.

By instituting a fraudulent inducement action for damages 127 sustained in the performance of a contract, however, the defrauded party
is deemed to affirm the contract. 128 Thus, the arbitration clause remains
126 Professor Corbin elucidated the traditional view:
Suppose, however, that the agreement to arbitrate disputes is a component part
of the very bargaining transaction that is now asserted to be void for want of
mutual assent, consideration, or capacity, or to be voidable for fraud, duress,
lack of capacity or mistake . . . . It would seem that if the alleged defect exists,
it affects the provision for arbitration just as much as it affects the other provisions. Even if, for some purposes, the provision for arbitration is declared to
be independent and collateral, the factor that makes the rest of the transaction
void or voidable would affect that transaction as a whole ....
6A A. CORBIN, CoNTRACrs 449 (1962). Those favoring the separability approach counter that
[t]he argument that the arbitrator would, in effect, be deciding the existence of
the contract from which his jurisdiction stems would not apply because his
authority is embodied in the "separate" arbitration agreement.
DouMK, supra note 110, at 57.
In Cheney Bros. v. Joroco Dresses, Inc., 218 App. Div. 652, 653, 219 N.Y.S. 96 (Ist
Dep't 1926) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 245 N.Y. 375, 157 N.E. 272 (1927), the
court held that fraud in the inducement places in issue the existence of the contract and
that "if the contract was voided by fraud the arbitration provision therein falls." In
reversing, the Court of Appeals held that no fraud had been demonstrated, but did not
comment on the separability question. In In re Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 288 N.Y. 467,
471, 43 N.E.2d 493, 495, reargument denied, 289 N.Y. 649, 44 N.E.2d 622 (1942), the Court
of Appeals found that arbitration clauses are directed to the remedy, rather than to the
validity of the underlying contract, and that proceedings to enforce arbitration "presuppose the existence of a valid and enforceable contract at the time the remedy is sought."
See also Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579
(1930); Manufacturers Chem. Co. v. Caswell, Strauss &:Co., 259 App. Div. 321, 19 N.Y.S.2d
171 (1st Dep't 1940); Royal Hair Pin Corp. v. Rieser Co., 218 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup.
Ct Kings County), modified and aft'd, 15 App. Div. 2d 539, 222 N.Y.S.2d 719 (2d
Dep't 1961); Application of Grossman, 203 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959);
Reo Garment, Inc. v. Jason Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 521, 170 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1958); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Dewitt Dev. Corp., 150 Misc. 408, 269
N.Y.S. 104 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1931). The issue of usury, which also challenges the
validity of the principal contract, has been held to be for judicial determination. Metro
Plan, Inc. v. Miscione, 257 App. Div. 652, 15 N.YS.2d 35 (1st Dep't 1939). Thus, "[u]nder
New York law ... it is essential that the party seeking to avoid arbitration . . . have a
proper claim for rescission of the contract." DomXx 63.
127 An action for rescission of the basic contract does not preclude the recovery of
special damages by the defrauded party to return him to the position he occupied before
making the disputed agreement. Generally, however, a party cannot both affirm the contract and receive damages based on breach, while at the same time rescind the contract
and recover restitutionary damages. See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280
F.2d 915, 927 n.15 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960), citing N.Y. LAw REvISiON
COMM'N REP. 291-344 (1941).
12
8In Amerotron Corp. v. Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co., 3 App. Div. 2d 899, 162
N.Y.S.2d 214 (1st Dep't 1957) (mem.), afl'd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 722, 148 N.E.2d 319, 171
N.Y.S.2d 111 (1958), the court directed arbitration upon a finding that the contract was
being affirmed and that the arbitration agreement was sufficiently broad to encompass the
issue of fraudulent inducement. See also M.W. Kellogg Co. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 9
App. Div. 2d 744, 192 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Ist Dep't 1959) (per curiam). Domke observed that
[a]s a result of the Amerotron and Monsanto cases, it is probably safe to generalize
that where a contract contains a broad arbitration agreement . . . . the issue of
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valid and disputes within its purview must be submitted to the arbitrator. 29
The principal Court of Appeals decision in this area is WrapVertiser Corp. v. Plotnick.180 The Court, faced with an action for damages rather than for rescission, held that the issue of fraudulent
inducement was for judicial determination, since the arbitration clause
in question was not broad enough to encompass the relief sought.' 3 '
The Court, however, in dictum, strongly emphasized that had rescisfraudulent inducement of the contract may be determined by the arbitrator in
New York.
DoaNtK 62. His statement is subject to qualification by the rescission-performance distinction, since in both cases the court found that the basic contract was being affirmed.
In Lipman v. Haeuser Shellac Co., 289 N.Y. 76, 80-81, 43 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1942), the
Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he question of performance goes to the merits, and that,
the parties have consented to have decided by the arbitral tribunal." Although the issue
in Lipman concerned cancellation of a contract rather than fraudulent inducement, the
underlying principle that performance questions are arbitrable is equally applicable in
fraud cases. Other cases directing arbitration upon a finding that the underlying contract
had been affirmed include Terminal Auxiliar Maritima v. Winkler Credit Corp., 6 N.Y.2d
294, 160 N.E.2d 526, 189 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1959); Kahn v. National City Bank, 284 N.Y. 515, 32
N.E.2d 534 (1940); Mine. Apter Sutton Cleaners, Inc. v. Andrew Newman Custom Cleaners,
Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 597, 240 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Ist Dep't 1963) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 14
N.Y.2d 515, 248 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1964); General Fuse Co. v. Sightmaster Corp., 5 App. Div.
2d 1013, 174 N.Y.S.2d 270 (2d Dep't 1958) (mem.). In Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5
N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959), the Court upheld the validity of a
specific disclaimer against fraudulent inducement which was included in the basic contract; raising the issue of fraud in such an instance would presumably not result in a
stay of arbitration.
129 Under the separability concept, the rescission-performance distinction becomes
irrelevant, since the arbitration clause is viewed as distinct from the principal contract
regardless of the mode of relief requested. A leading advocate of the separability approach
has argued that the distinction followed by the New York courts is "artificial and in
any event denies any weight to the parties' contractual intent." Aksen, Prima Paint v.
Flood & Conklin- What Does it Mean?, 43 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 1, 11 (1968) [hereinafter
Aksen].
130 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 NXE.2d 366, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957) (4-3).
181 The arbitration clause in Wrap made arbitrable any question "as to the validity,
interpretation or performance of [the] agreement." Id. at 18, 143 N.E2d at 366, 163
N.Y.S.2d at 640. It is always a threshold matter for judicial determination whether a
particular controversy is encompassed within the arbitration clause in question, unless
the clause itself or a subsequent stipulation expressly confers such authority upon the
arbitrator. See Lafayette Iron Works, Inc. v. Wilaka Constr. Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 487,
255 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Ist Dep't 1965) (per curiam); Uddo v. Taormina, 21 App. Div. 2d 402,
250 N.YS.2d 645 (1st Dep't 1964). In Wrap the petitioner sought "[d]amages for breach
of contract arising from fraud and misrepresentation inducing claimant to enter into
the contract" (3 N.Y.2d at 18, 143 N.E2d at 366, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 640), which the majority
held was not a question relating to the "validity, interpretation or performance" of the
principal contract. The dissent argued vigorously that
[t]he claims asserted here are related to the contract and to the prior course of
dealings engaged in by the parties in connection with the contract. They are so
interrelated that whether the conduct challenged occurred prior or subsequent
to the execution of the contract, the appraisal of the conduct is within the
defined jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
Id. at 21, 143 N.E.2d at 368, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
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sion of the contract been sought, "such an issue would have had to have
been decided in court before it could be known that an agreement
13 2
existed supplying a foundation for the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.'
In Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta,'3 3 the petitioner sought a stay of

arbitration on the ground that the underlying contract was void for
want of mutuality. The Court of Appeals, per Judge Fuld, noted four
exceptions to the general policy of directing arbitration in accordance
with the scope of the arbitration clause: (1) where fraud or duress
results in a voidable agreement; (2) where there is no genuine dispute
between the parties; (3) where the performance sought to be compelled
in the arbitral forum is prohibited by statute; and (4) where the parties
have not complied with a condition precedent to arbitration.8 4 While
the Court specifically upheld Wrap as to enjoining arbitration of the
fraudulent inducement issue, the majority undercut the non-separability rationale of earlier decisions by ordering arbitration although
the existence of a valid underlying contract had not yet been established. The majority concluded:
Once it be ascertained that the parties broadly agreed to arbitrate
a dispute "arising out of or in connection with" the agreement, it
is for the arbitrators to deide what the agreement means and to
enforce it according to the rules of law which they deem appropriate in the circumstances' 3 85

The dissent in Exercycle favored the traditional view, 86 while the
concurring opinion noted that the majority had apparently adopted
the separability theory, 37 a contention which most commentators on
Exercycle support. 18
13 3 N.Y.2d at 20, 143 N.E.2d at 367, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
133 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961), noted in 75 HARv. L. REv.
835; 23 Omo STATE L.J. 351; 9 U.C.LA.L. Rv. 214; 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 107 (all 1962).
'34 Id. at 334-35, 174 N.E2d 465, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 356. The second exception would
seem no longer applicable, since CPLR 7501, enacted subsequent to Exercycle, provides
that "the court shall not consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration
is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute."
135 9 N.Y.2d at 334, 174 N.E.2d at 464, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
13681d. at 340, 174 N.E.2d at 469, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
137 Id. at 340, 174 N.E.2d at 468, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 360. The concurring opinion maintained that as a matter of law the contract in question was not void for want of
mutuality, and strongly criticized the majority's rationale.
13s Gerald Aksen of the American Arbitration Association, an advocate of the separability approach, argued:
Indeed, Exercycle v. Maratta, the very case which contained dictum to the effect
that arbitration would not lie where the plaintiff seeks rescission for fraud, can
itself be cited for the proposition that arbitration clauses are separable in New
York. ... It is difficult in logic to explain how an arbitrator can void such an
agreement unless, in fact, his authority stems from a "separate" contract.
Aksen, supra note 129, at 10. See also 75 HARV. L. Rlv. 835-36 (1962) and the commen-

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Although Exercycle supported Wrap, its rationale indicates that
the separability question is unsettled in New York. If the court can
direct arbitration notwithstanding the need to determine the validity
of the underlying contract when lack of mutuality is alleged, there
would seem to be no logical basis for staying arbitration when the
validity of the principal contract is challenged by a claim of fraud or
39
duress.1
Prior to Exercycle,340 several decisions apparently departed from
the traditional view that the issue of fraudulent inducement is for the
court to determine when rescission of the principal contract is sought.
In Lugay Frocks, Inc. v. Joint Board Dressmakers' Union,'4 ' the Sutaries on Exercycle cited in note 133 supra. Not all commentators, however, viewed
Exercycle as an adoption of the separability approach:
To press Exercyle into the separability mould, as some have done, is to disregard Judge Fuld's opinion, which leaves no doubt that it views the parties'
undertaking to arbitrate only in terms of its being a constituent part of their
overall "agreement."
Collins, Arbitration and the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 736, 747 (1966).
139 See 8 WK&M
7501.25. Professor Corbin, criticized the Exercycle decision:
No arbitrator has power to invent rules of law that will validate the contract by
which his power as an arbitrator is created; its validity depends upon the rules
of law antecedently known to and enforced by the courts. . . . If the court's
statement were correct, there would be no reason for the four exceptions that
the court enumerateld]. The issue was not one of "interpretation"; it was as
to the legal operation of uncontroverted facts. . . . If the agreement was void
for "lack of mutuality," the arbitration clause fell with the rest.
6A A. CosaiN, CoNTRAcrs 452 nA0.5 (1962).
In 1963, CPA 1450, which provided that the court must direct arbitration "upon
being satisfied that there is no substantial issue as to the making of the contract," was
replaced by CPLR 7503(a), which reads that the court must consider "whether a valid
agreement was made." While it has been suggested that the insertion of the word "valid"
indicates a legislative intent to change Exercycle (see Durst v. Abrash, 22 App. Div. 2d 39,
41, 253 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (Ist Dep't 1964), aff'd mem., 17 N.Y.2d 445, 213 N.E.2d 887,
266 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1965)), if it is taken as referring to the entire contract, the better view
is that the compliance provision refers solely to the arbitration agreement, and that the
Exercycle rule requiring submission to the arbitrator of all issues within the scope of the
arbitration clause remains the law in New York. See 7B McKNNEY's CPLR 7503, supp.
commentary at 175 (1965); Note, Judicial Control of the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: A
Changing Attitude, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 521, 530 n.34 (1963). See also 8 WK&M
7503.02.
140 Several early cases, while not dealing with fraudulent inducement, indicated a
judicial sympathy toward the separability concept. In Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg.
Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929), the Court of Appeals apparently adopted the
separability approach for conflicts purposes in construing an arbitration provision in
accordance with the New York statute, even though the underlying contract contemplated performance in Massachusetts. Professor Nussbaum, in The "Separability Doctrine" in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. R.Fv. 609, 615 n.28 (1940),
noted the case, In re Albert, 95 N.Y.L.J. 59, March 12, 1936, at 1276, col. 7 (N.Y. City
Ct. N.Y. County), an arbitration confirmation proceeding in which the court expressly
adopted the separability theory. Nussbaum also cited Exeter Mfg. Co. v. Marrus, 254 App.
Div. 496, 5 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Ist Dep't 1938), in which the court directed arbitration notwithstanding an apparent noncompliance with the Statute of Frauds. For Nussbaum this
represented "the 'separability doctrine' applied to the question of formalities." Nussbaum,
supra, at 614.
141 140 N.Y.L.J. 1, July 1, 1958, at 3, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 6
App. Div. 2d 1000, 177 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (lst Dep't 1958).
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preme Court, New York County, held that fraudulent concealment of a
contract provision, by which the contract was induced, gives the defrauded party the right to rescind the contract, but that "such concealment cannot be the basis for staying arbitration. As long as there is a
signed contract in existence providing for arbitration, the respondents
have the right to demand arbitration .... '1142 In Aaron Krumbeim &
Sons, Inc., v. Winola Silk Mills, Inc.,143 the same court, faced with a
rescission action based on fraudulent inducement, stated simply that the
"parties may provide for the arbitration of such questions as would
give one of them the right to rescind."' 44 In Fabrex Corp. v. Winard
Sales Co.,1 45 the court stated in dictum:
Where an arbitration clause is broad and all inclusive, a request
for rescission, either in a pending action or in a demand for arbitration, based upon fraud in the inducement, will be left for determination of the arbitrators. 14
While these cases did not refer to separability, that theory appears to
be the only basis on which the courts could have argued, the validity
of the principal contracts having been challenged.
Two decisions after Exercycle, both of which directed arbitration
in rescission actions based on fraudulent inducement, failed to consider
Exercycle. In Amphenol Corp. v. Microlab,147 the Supreme Court, New
York County, relying solely on Fabrex, asserted that "[t]he issue of
fraudulent inducement of a contract may unquestionably be arbitrated
in New York.' 48 In Coler v. GCA Corp., 49 the First Department, relying on Fabrex and Amphenol, directed arbitration and stated that
regardless of the possibility that the ultimate result of the arbitration might be vitiation of the very contract under which the arbi142 Id.

143 133 N.Y.L.J. 65, April 4, 1955, at 6, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955).
144 Id.

145 23 Misc. 2d 26, 200 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1960).
146Id. at 27, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 280. Although the court dearly indicated that arbitration would be directed even if rescission of the principal contract were sought, the
basis of the court's decision is in line with the traditional view "that issues raised by
claims relating to performance of contracts... are for determination by the arbitrators."
Id. The court distinguished Wrap on the ground that the arbitration clause there was too
narrow to encompass the relief sought.
147 49 Misc. 2d 46, 266 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965), aff'd mem., 25 App.
Div. 2d 497, 267 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1st Dep't 1966).
148 Id. at 47, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 769. The court further noted that such questions were
contingent upon the scope of the particular arbitration clause, but did not explore the
traditional rescission-performance distinction.
149 39 App. Div. 2d 656, 331 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1st Dep't) (mem.), aIJ'd mem., 31 N.Y.2d
775, 291 N.E.2d 385, 339 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1972).
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tration will have taken place ... the contract will have remained
0
viable a sufficient period of time to sustain the arbitration.

The Coler majority, while not alluding to the separability concept,
thus appeared to view the arbitration clause as a separate entity whose
validity would be unaffected by a determination that the underlying
contract is void.
While Wrap has not been specifically overruled, Exercycle and
decisions such as Fabrex, Amphenol, and Coler reveal a certain confusion and uncertainty as to the exact state of the law in New York on the
separability issue. While New York courts have moved slowly and with
conflicting results toward acceptance of that approach, the federal
courts have acted decisively in this area, although some questions as to
the applicability of federal substantive law in the state courts remain
unanswered.
In Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,Inc.,151 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act,l5 2 which makes an arbitration provision in a contract involving
maritime transactions or interstate commerce "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable," pertained solely to the arbitration clause itself, and that,
therefore, an arbitration provision was separable from the principal
contract. Thus, the court reasoned:
Once it is settled that arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable" we know of no principle of law that stands as an
1501d., 331 N.Y.S.2d at 938-39. The court, as in Amphenol, cited Fabrex for the
proposition that Wrap was not controlling because of the limited arbitration provision
there, without commenting on the fact that both Wrap and Fabrex were held to be concerned with performance, rather than rescission, questions. The Coler dissent vigorously
espoused the traditional approach.
151271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 US. 801 (1960), noted in 60
COLUm. L. REv. 227; 45 COmREL L.Q. 795; 73 H v. L. REy. 1382; 108 U. PA. L. Rxv.
915; 69 YALE LJ. 847 (all 1960). Prior to Lawrence, a number of federal decisions had
apparently viewed the arbitration clause as separable, at least to the extent of holding
that the unenforceability of the arbitration provision would not undermine the validity
of the principal contract. The Supreme Court, referring to an arbitration clause in an
insurance policy, held that "the separate and independent provision . . . for submitting
to arbitration the amount of the loss, is a distinct and collateral agreement. . . ."
Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 137 U.S. 370, 386 (1890). In Gatlift Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d
876, 881 (6th Cir. 1944), the court viewed arbitration provisions as "collateral and independent of the other parts of the contract. .. ." It had also been established that illegality
of part of the principal contract would not vitiate the arbitration clause. See Watkins v.
Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 777, rehearing denied,
327 U.S. 816 (1946). Two early commentators on the federal arbitration statute argued
that, "[w]here the main contract is repudiated, it is manifestly unsound to deny to either
party the right to arbitration if a provision for such exists .. " Baum & Pressman, The
Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REv. 428, 439 (1931).
152 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
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obstacle to a determination by the parties to the effect that arbitration should not be denied or postponed upon the mere cry of fraud
in the inducement, as this would permit the frustration of the very

purposes sought to be achieved by the agreement to arbitrate, i.e.,
a speedy and relatively inexpensive trial before commercial
specialists.

158

The United States Supreme Court, in PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Manufacturing Co.,154 endorsed the Second Circuit's
adoption of the separability theory as a matter of federal substantive
law. The Court, however, relied on section 4 of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 55 which provides that arbitration must be directed when the
court is satisfied that a valid arbitration agreement has been made. It
reasoned:
Under § 4, with respect to a matter within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts save for the existence of an arbitration clause, the
federal court is instructed to order arbitration to proceed once
it is satisfied that "the making of the agreement for arbitration or
the failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in
issue." Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the
arbitration clause itself - an issue which goes to the "making" of

the agreement to arbitrate - the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the federal
court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract

generally. 56

While PrimaPaint binds the federal courts,

57

the Supreme Court

153 271 F.2d at 410. The Second Circuit subsequently placed certain limitations on
the separability concept, however. In El Hoss Eng'r & Transp. Co. v. American Independent Oil Co., 289 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961), the court held
that an arbitration clause was not separable upon an allegation of failure to comply
with an express condition precedent. The court, in In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951
(2d Cir. 1961), held that the arbitration provision must still be broad enough to encompass an allegation of fraudulent inducement; thus, the separability approach does not
preclude judicial determination of whether a specific controversy is within the scope of
the arbitration agreement in question. Domke has observed:
Under the separability rule, the only test of what may be arbitrated is the
measure of the scope of the arbitration clause. . . . Whether a clause is sufficiently broad must be decided on a case-by-case basis by the court.
DoMasE 59. The Kinoshita court held that the standard arbitration clause of the American
Arbitration Association is broad enough to encompass the question of fraudulent inducement of the underlying contract. The Association's arbitration agreement provides:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the Rules,
then obtaining, of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon
the award rendered may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
154 88 U.S. 395 (1967).
155 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
156 388 U.S. at 403-04.
'57 See, e.g., Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d
606, 610 (2d Cir. 1969).
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did not mandate that state courts adopt a similar approach when dealing with maritime transactions and interstate commerce. In the landmark case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,158 the Supreme Court ruled
that when diversity of citizenship was the only ground for federal jurisdiction, the federal courts must apply state substantive law. 1 9 In Bern6 0 the Court held that
hardt v. PolygraphicCo. of America,1
in diversity
cases involving intrastate transactions, the federal courts must follow
state law in determining whether to stay or compel arbitration.' 6 ' After
Bernhardt,there was a split of authority as to whether the federal statute or state law was applicable in diversity cases involving interstate
commerce and maritime transactions. 16 2 Lawrence held that section 2
of the Act, by making arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable" irrespective of state policy, represented "a declaration of
163
national law equally applicable in state or federal courts."'
158 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
159 For a general discussion of Erie questions under the federal Arbitration Act, see
Kochery, The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts: Erie v.
Tompkins, 89 ConN~mt L.Q. 74 (1953); Sturges and Murphy, Some Confusing Matters
Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 L.Aw & CONTEMP. PROB.
580 (1952); Note, The Scope of the United States Arbitration Act in Commercial Arbitration: Problems in Federalism, 58 Nw. UX. R v. 468 (1963); Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 VAND. L. Rnv. 607 (1967); Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section
2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A Farrago of Rights, Remedies and a Right to
a Remedy, 69 YALE LJ.847 (1960).
160 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
161 The rationale of Bernhardt was that the federal courts must apply the relevant
state law because it is outcome-determinative; thus, it was held to be immaterial whether
state courts considered questions under state arbitration statutes as substantive or procedural. The outcome-determinative test was enunciated in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
826 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), in which the Supreme Court argued:
In essence, the intent of [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal
court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of
the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it
would be if tried in a State court. The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a
nonresident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block away,
should not lead to a substantially different result.
162 The First and Ninth Circuits held that state law was applicable. See Lummus
Co..v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 911
(1960); Ross v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 286 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1956). The
Second Circuit, in Lawrence, held that the United States Arbitration Act, as federal substantive law, was applicable in the federal courts. This position was followed in Amicizia
Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 863 U.S. 843 (1960).
163 271 F.2d at 407. The Lawrence court distinguished Bernhardt on the ground that
the arbitrable controversy therein was not an interstate commercial or maritime transaction; it further maintained that had the drafters of the federal Arbitration Act anticipated Erie they would have intended the act to represent federal substantive law. Thus,
it concluded that the statute was concerned
not with state-created rights but with rights arising out of the exercise by the
Congress of its constitutional power to regulate commerce and hence there is
involved no difficult question of constitutional law under Erie.
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The majority in Prima Paint did not comment on the Lawrence
court's assertion that the federal statute was binding on the state
courts. 64 The dissent, however, stressed that "[t]he Court here does not
hold today.., that the body of federal substantive law created by federal judges under the Arbitration Act is required to be applied by state
courts." 165
Although PrimaPaint does not mandate that the states adopt its
interpretation of the federal arbitration statute, it seems likely that state
courts will follow Prima Paint in order to discourage forum shopping
and insure uniformity in interstate commercial transactions.1 66 In A[S
J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Dow Chemical Co., 167 the New York
Court of Appeals, in construing an arbitration clause in a maritime
Id. at 404-05. The court's holding that federal law was controlling on the issue of arbitrability within the purview of the act was expressly followed in Metro Indus. Painting
Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 868 U.S. 817 (1961).
Although the Lawrence court saw no Erie difficulties in its decision, it is apparent
that Lawrence reduces the impact of Erie on the federal arbitration statute. The significance of its holding is that
the [act] is brought into play also in diversity actions in the federal courts when
commerce or a maritime transaction is involved. Recognition of section 2 as
substantive federal law means that whenever its provisions apply it will necessarily override state law on the subject, and render Erie R.R. v. Tompkins inapplicable. Where neither commerce nor maritime transactions are involved, however, federal courts in diversity cases will continue to apply state law with
regard to arbitration clauses.
45 CoaNL L.Q. 795, 797 (1960). The Lawrence court's assertion that the federal arbitration statute is binding on the state courts would mean that arbitration clauses in
interstate commercial and maritime transactions would fall within the purview of § 2
regardless of diversity of citizenship or jurisdictional amount. This aspect of Lawrence
has been subjected to criticism in that, "[p]olitically and historically considered, it is in
7501.12.
conflict with fundamental concepts of federalism." 8 WK&M
164The Supreme Court in Prima Paint did hold that the United States Arbitration
Act was federal substantive law binding on the federal courts:
The question in this case, however, is not whether Congress may fashion federal
substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple diversity cases . . .
Rather, the question is whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are
to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly
has power to legislate. The answer to that can only be in the affirmative. And
it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and
confined to the incontestable federal foundations of "control over interstate
commerce and over admiralty."
888 U.S. at 405. The same modifications of Erie which were noted with respect to Lawrence would seem equally applicable to Prima Paint. A controversy must be in federal
court, however, because of diversity of citizenship, since the federal Arbitration Act does
not itself provide a separate basis on which the federal courts may assume jurisdiction.
See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970); DOMKE 27.
165 888 U.S. at 424. For general discussion of Erie questions in the federal and state
courts following Prima Paint, see Note, The Federal Arbitration Act in State Courts:
Converse Erie Problems, 55 CORNELL L. Ray. 623 (1970); Note, Federal Arbitration Act
and Application of the "Separability Doctrine" in Federal Courts, 1968 Durm L. Rav. 588.
166 See, e.g., Aksen at 23; Coulson, Prima Paint: An Arbitration Milestone, 23 Bus.
LAw. 241 (1967).
16725 N.Y.2d 576, 255 N.E2d 774, 807 N.Y.S.2d 660, cert. denied, 898 US. 989
(1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 342, 365-66 (1970).
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agreement, held that in commercial transactions to which the Federal
Arbitration Act, by its terms, is applicable, "PrimaPaint leaves no plausible alternative but application of the Federal statute in state courts as
well as in Federal courts."10 18 The Appellate Division, First Department,
in Aerojet-General Corp. v. Non-Ferrous Metal Refining, Ltd.,0 9
where the parties agreed that the federal act governed, clearly adopted
the federal separability approach with respect to an interstate commercial contract allegedly induced by fraud.
Although the First Department viewed the arbitration provision
and the principal contract as separable in Aerojet, the same court leaned
toward the more traditional New York view in Housekeeperv. Lourie.17
The petitioners, partners with the respondent, an attorney, sought a
stay of arbitration on the ground that they had been fraudulently induced to enter into an agreement for the termination of the partnership. They alleged that the respondent had misrepresented the contract
as the only means to terminate the partnership, thereby breaching his
fiduciary duty as their attorney.
The court, in reviewing decisions such as Fabrex, Amphenol, and
Coler, offered as a summary of existing law a statement closely approximating the separability position:
If issues with regard to alleged fraud or misrepresentation are
within the scope of an arbitration clause and the clause itself is not'
rendered invalid or voidable by reason of the alleged fraud or misrepresentation, the issues are to be submitted to and determined by
the arbitrators. 171
The court limited this statement by adding that it is fraud in the performance of a contract which is arbitrable, thus expressing the traditional New York view. The cases the court cited, however, maintain
that the arbitrator may consider the question of fraudulent inducement
168 Id. at 579-80, 255 N.E.2d at 775-76, 807 N.Y.S.2d at 662. The Court further argued:

It is particularly important to apply Federal law in the present case, for, to
hold otherwise would (1) permit, indeed encourage, forum shopping; (2) prevent
and undermine the need for nationwide uniformity in the interpretation and
application of arbitration clauses in foreign and interstate transactions; and (3)
permit individuals to circumvent the national law relating to arbitration agreements as called for by the [federal Arbitration Act].
Id. at 580, 255 N.E.2d at 776, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
109 37 App. Div. 2d 531, 322 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1st Dep't 1971) (mem.). Echoing the
Supreme Court's language in Prima Paint, the court held that
applying the Federal Act and under the broad arbitration clause here involved,
the issue of fraudulent inducement is for the arbitrators. Only if the claim is
fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself-an issue which goes
to the "making" of the agreement to arbitrate-may the court resolve it.
Id. at 532, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
170 39 App. Div. 2d 280, 333 N.Y.S.2d 932 (lst Dep't 1972).
171 Id. at 282, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
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when rescission is sought. 1'7 2 Thus, the court's statement is susceptible to
inconsistent interpretations.
The court's precise holding was that
[w]here, as here, there is a prima facie showing of an issue as to
whether there exists a valid and binding agreement for arbitration
and such issue is timely and properly raised, it is to be determined
by the court.173
While its holding that arbitration must be stayed where fraud touches
the arbitration provision itself is consistent with the state and federal
positions, ' 4 the court considered primarily the question of fraud in the
principal contract and not whether fraudulent inducement pertained
specifically to the arbitration provision. Noting that the petitioners' allegations "show[ed] fraud permeating the entire agreement," the court
refused to hold as a matter of law that the agreement to terminate the
partnership "resulted from 'arm's length negotiations' rendering applicable an assumption that, notwithstanding the alleged fraud, the dominant intention of the parties was to settle their disputes by arbitration."'1 75 It further noted that if the broad allegations of fraud were
true, the entire contract, including the arbitration clause, "should be
avoided as constituting a fraudulent breach of the fiduciary relationship
between an attorney and his clients."'' 7 6
172 The court also cited M.W. Kellogg Co. v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 9 App. Div.
2d 744, 192 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Ist Dep't 1959) (per curiam), which does refer to performance
questions (see note 128 supra), and Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969), in which the court expressly followed Prima Paint. The
Housekeeper court, while not rejecting the separability concept, referred with approval
to two opinions which adopted the non-separability approach. It noted the concurring
opinion in Exercycle, which strongly criticized the majority's apparent adoption of the
separability theory, and it also cited Justice Black's concurring opinion in Moseley v.
Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.s. 167, 172 (1963), in which he argued that
fraudulent inducement of an arbitration contract, "like fraud in the procurement of any
contract, makes it void and unenforceable and that this question of fraud is a judicial
one. . . ." Justice Black's opposition to the separability theory became even more apparent in his dissenting opinion in Prima Paint:

The Court holds, what is to me fantastic, that the legal issue of a contract's
voidness because of fraud is to be decided by persons designated to arbitrate
factual controversies arising out of a valid contract between the parties ...
I am by no means sure that thus forcing a person to forgo his opportunity to
try his legal issues in the courts where, unlike the situation in arbitration, he
may have a jury trial and right to appeal, is not a denial of due process of law.
388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967).
173 39 App. Div. 2d at 285, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
174 See Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963). See also
Comment, The Arbitrable Issue: The Problem of Fraud, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 802, 805-06

(1960).
175 59 App. Div. 2d at 285,
176Id. Housekeeper raises

333 N.YS.2d at 938.
a difficult question as to whether arbitration may be

stayed where a contract is fraudulently induced through breach of a fiduciary duty.
Public policy may require judicial resolution of such controversies. In the absence of
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The court's reasoning is clearly a rejection of the separability concept, since the court was unwilling to consider simply the arbitration
provision itself, but rather looked to the entire agreement, and concluded that if the total contract were fraudulently induced, the arbitration clause, as an element thereof, must also have been touched by the
alleged fraud. The federal approach is to differentiate between fraudulent inducement of the underlying contract and fraud which specifically
induces the arbitration agreement. Both the federal and New York
courts will stay arbitration in the latter instance, but the New York
courts, notwithstanding Exercycle, will apparently also stay arbitration
upon a general showing of fraud in the principal contract.
Housekeeper v. Lourie is the most recent illustration of the uncertainty of New York law as to the separability issue. 177 Tfie United States
legislative authority for staying arbitration on public policy grounds, some courts have
done so.
The Exercycle Court stated that arbitration should be stayed where the performance
sought to be compelled in the arbitral forum is prohibited by statute. 9 N.Y.2d 329,
334-35, 174 N.E.2d 463, 465, 214 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (1961). In Aimcee Wholesale Corps. v.
Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968), the Court
held that the state's interest in enforcing its antitrust policy must preclude a resolution
of such issues by commercial arbitrators. In Agur v. Agur, 32 App. Div. 2d 16, 298
N.Y.S.2d 772 (2d Dep't 1969), the court denied arbitration in a custody action pursuant
to a Mexican divorce decree, even though the court found the dispute to be within the
terms of the arbitration provision. In Durst v. Abrash, 22 App. Div. 2d 39, 253 N.Y.S.2d
851 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd mem., 17 N.Y.2d 445, 213 N.E.2d 887, 266 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1965),
the court stated that common-law grounds for staying arbitration should be distinguished
from public policy grounds. Dean McLaughlin summarized the Durst argument:
Questions as to the validity of the contract under the common law, e.g., questions of mutuality, consideration, rescission, etc., should be left to the arbitrators.
Questions of invalidity which trench heavily upon public policy, e.g., fraud,
duress and usury, should be retained in the courts lest the overreaching party, by
the simple expedient of inserting an arbitration clause and selecting friendly
arbitrators, insulate his misdeed from judicial review.
7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 7503, supp. commentary at 174 (1965). The Durst rationale has
been criticized in that
faced with any allegation, a court has jurisdiction only to consider whether there
is an agreement to arbitrate and whether the dispute is within the terms of the
agreement.... Moreover, the statute does not indicate that the courts were intended to retain jurisdiction over questions of "public policy" even when reviewing arbitrators' decisions.
42 WAsH. L. RLv. 621, 627 n24 (1967).
177 The Supreme Court, in Prima Paint, observed:
Whether a party seeking rescission of a contract on the ground of fraudulent
inducement may in New York obtain judicial resolution of his claim is not
entirely clear ....
In light of our disposition of this case, we need not decide
the status of the issue under New York law.
388 U.S. 395, 400 n.3 (1967). The Second Circuit viewed the adoption of the CPLR as
bringing New York law into conformity with the federal separability approach:
Subsequent cases under the new statute indicate that the restrictive view taken
in Exercycle is no longer the law in New York, and that the distinction recognized
in the Federal Arbitration Act . . . between fraud in the inducement of the
arbitration clause itself and fraud with respect to the contract generally has
been adopted in New York.
Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat1 Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606, 611-12 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1969).
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Arbitration Act was modelled specifically on the New York arbitration
17 8
statute. The corresponding provisions should be interpreted similarly.
Furthermore, the New York courts, in Rederi and Aerojet, voluntarily
followed the Prima Paint holding in maritime and interstate commercial transactions and considered an arbitration clause as distinct from
the underlying contract. It is anomalous, therefore, to reject the separability approach when confronted with wholly intrastate activities,
there being no compelling public interest requiring a different standard
for intrastate commercial dealings.
New York, historically the leader in encouraging arbitration and
developing a sophisticated arbitration jurisprudence, should clarify the
present confusion as to its treatment of the question of fraudulent inducement and adopt the progressive separability approach of the federal courts. It should no longer remain the only state with a modern
arbitration statute to follow a non-separability rule. 79
CPLR 7501: Broad arbitrationclause compels submission of question
of recovery of consequential damages to arbitrator notwithstanding
damage limitation clause.
In Allen Knitting Mills v. Dorado Dress Corp.,18 0 the appellant, a
textiles seller, applied to stay arbitration on the ground that the respondent, who sought consequential damages, was barred from such recovery by clauses in their contracts limiting the appellant's liability to
the difference in value between goods ordered and goods actually received. Each of the arbitration clauses encompassed "[a]ny controversy
or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, any interpretation
thereof or breach thereof.

. .

." The Appellate Division, First Depart-

ment, affirmed the lower court's denial of a stay, noting that the arbi181
trator derives his authority from the scope of the arbitration clause,
178 See Aksen at 10. The adoption of CPLR 7501, deleting the terminology declaring
arbitration agreements to be "valid, enforceable and irrevocable," which was found in
CPA 1448 and is currently found in § 2 of the federal statute, should not be viewed as
a modification of New York's traditional approach favoring arbitration. It is the better
view that this expression has been deleted as unnecessary. See 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR
7501, commentary at 433 (1963); 8 WK&M f 7501.03.
179 "[N]either New Jersey nor Maryland nor any [of the other twenty-one states]
with a modem arbitration law - with the possible exception of New York - has formulated
a rule of non-separability." Aksen at 9. The separability approach is also widely followed
in Europe. See Nussbaum, The "Separability Doctrine" in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U.LQ. REV. 609 (1940).
180 39 App. Div. 2d 286, 833 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Ist Dep't 1972) (per curiam).
181 The Court of Appeals, in Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 336, 174
N.E.2d 463, 466, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 857 (1961), noted: "Where there is a broad provision
arbitration may be had as to all issues arising under the contract."
for arbitration ....

